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Interview
CWBR AUTHOR INTERVIEW: THE UNION WAR
Gallagher, Gary
Summer 2011

Interview with Dr. Gary Gallagher, John L. Nau III Professor of History at
the University of Virginia
Interviewed by Nathan Buman
Click here for the review
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): Today, I'm delighted to be joined by Gary
Gallagher who is John L. Nau III Professor of History at the University of
Virginia to discuss his most recent book The Union War. Professor Gallagher,
thank you for talking with us today.
Gary Gallagher (GG): Thanks for inviting me.
CWBR: You mention in the acknowledgements that you came up with the
idea for this book ten years ago; how did you decide to approach this question
and look at a study of the Civil War through the concept of Union?
GG: I began talking about the book ten years ago with Joyce Seltzer, who is
the editor I worked with at Harvard on an earlier book, The Confederate War.
But I've really been thinking about this for much longer than that. I've been
thinking about it because I've found over the years perhaps the most difficult
thing to explain to students, or groups of adults to whom I speak about the war, is
why the loyal citizenry thought Union was worth fighting for. It's a very hard
concept for many modern Americans to come to terms with: why would someone
from Vermont who is under no direct threat, either their property or their system
of local government, from the Confederates, why would they think it was
worthwhile to put on a uniform and risk their lives to save the Union? Union just
doesn't mean anything to us now, and it's very hard to explain that to modern
audiences.
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CWBR: I was especially intrigued by your discussion of language and
vocabulary, particularly when you discuss how the word "Union" has essentially
dropped from our current vocabulary but that it dominated the Civil War and
antebellum period. Why do you suppose that is the case? What did Union truly
mean to the wartime generation of soldiers and civilians?
GG: I do think Union has gone out of our vocabulary, literally gone out of
our vocabulary in terms of its mid-nineteenth-century meaning. Union has a
labor connation now; it has no tie to the way that it was used in the
mid-nineteenth century. In the mid-nineteenth century, Union and nation and
country and United States were deployed as synonyms frequently; they're
interchangeable in a lot of the writings that you see in the mid-nineteenth
century. I think that part of the problem now is that Union, among that cluster of
words, simply has dropped out. Now we think of nation, or we think of country.
And we take the nation for granted; we take all of the things for granted that were
much more fraught in the mid-nineteenth century. We can't imagine an internal
threat to the United States of the sort that galvanized the loyal citizenry between
1861 and 1865. Union is just a word that no longer has any meaning in that
regard, and if we don't have a sense of what that word means . . . I think
Elizabeth Varon's book from a couple of years ago, Disunion, helps get at the
meaning of the word. She talks about how important the word "disunion" was
and, of course, disunion can only be an important word if Union is an even more
important one. Why was the idea of disunion so troubling to so many people?
Well, it's because Union meant so much, and I think it meant a cluster of things.
It meant the legacy of the founding generation, the handiwork of the Philadelphia
Convention, the small "R" republican form of government, the small "D" form of
democracy; it meant a nation where common people had a voice in their own
government--of course, we're talking in a mid-nineteenth-century context, so that
is to say white men had a voice in their government--and also had the ability to
rise economically. Lincoln spoke to this beautifully, in many ways during the
war, but the really interesting and important thing to me is Lincoln is simply
saying the same kinds of things--he says them better--but he is saying the same
kinds of things that untold people are saying. This place is unique in the Western
World, the rest of the Western World is going in the wrong direction, advocates
of Union believe. They believe the failed revolutions of the 1840s show that the
European nations were falling even more into the embrace of oligarchy and
aristocracy and monarchy. In an American context, the slaveholding southerners
represented oligarchs and aristocrats; unionists in the free states deploy those
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words constantly in referring to those who led the secession movement.
Everything they stood for, slaveholding oligarchs, was inimical to the work and
promise of what the Founding Fathers had done from the perspective of those
who really took Union seriously. They also believed that Union had meaning
beyond the United States. It's important for all of those reasons within the United
States but beyond that, it's important because, they would argue, that democracy
had not at all been established in the Western World and if it fails here, it might
be snuffed out entirely. When Lincoln talks about the last, best hope of earth,
that's what he is talking about, but lots of other people used language very similar
to that. So it has a Trans-Atlantic meaning, and it also has a meaning for those
who lived in the United States: a profound meaning, something that would cause
people to risk their lives.
CWBR: You admit, up front, the challenges that any scholar must overcome
when looking at the motivations of the common soldier and/or the common
population during wartime, especially given the tremendous amount of letters
written during the American Civil War. What sorts of obstacles did you face in
trying to provide a broad enough scope to achieve a representation of the ways in
which soldiers and civilians, alike looked at Union and the Civil War?
GG: The key is, there's so much evidence from the Civil War that you can
argue anything. You can take almost any position and argue it, and you can find
evidence that supports what you want to argue. I don't just look at soldiers in this
book, but common soldier testimony is so voluminous that I think the only way
to come at it is to read as much as you can with the understanding that no scholar
can read anything but the tiniest percentage. We're talking about millions and
millions of letters that the soldiers wrote, any scholar who reads 20 or 25,000 of
them has done heroic labor in research. But those 25,000 letters are statistically
insignificant, and they cannot, in any way, be considered a real representative
sample of soldiers' sentiments. So I think it's important to place different kinds of
evidence in conversation with one another. Read as much as you can, pick out the
themes in the letters that you've read, and then compare those to what you find
elsewhere. There are other types of evidence you can use. In The Union War, I
used patriotic covers, newspapers, song lyrics, and other things. I believe
historians should use as many different kinds of evidence as possible--and when
you have the array of different kinds of evidence, see if themes cross over from
one kind to another. That's the way I think we have to come at this. Everything
we do is imperfect; there's just no way to get a perfect reading of what was going
on. But when I think that you look at an array of evidence, Union stands out. This
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includes the writings of Abraham Lincoln, who had as good a sense of what
motivated the loyal population as anyone. He was an incredibly perceptive
politician, and his public statements and statements designed to be leaked to the
public, so to speak, first and last, spoke of a war for Union. He says it in the
beginning; he says it in his message to Congress after the 1864 Presidential
Election. In the latter, he says, in every great war--I'm paraphrasing him--a
people have to have one overriding goal and in this great war of ours, its Union.
Much of what he is talking about in that statement is a plea to pass the Thirteenth
Amendment. But in calling for that, he specifically says the Thirteenth
Amendment emancipation, killing slavery--will be one of the tools to help
achieve the overriding goal of Union. Even at that late stage of the war, he
understood that, for most of the loyal citizenry, it's still about Union. Most of
them had embraced emancipation by that time, not for the reasons we would
want them to, not as a great moral crusade, but because they knew that
emancipation would help to beat the Rebels, would punish the slaveholding
oligarchs who caused all of the problems in the first place, and would create a
better Union, an improved Union, a Union that didn't have the poisonous issue of
slavery sort of lurking in the national political scene to rise up and cause a
problem such as that in the Secession Winter of 1860-61.
CWBR: If northerners were fighting for Union, does that mean southerners
were fighting primarily for disunion and not states' rights or slavery?
GG: I think it's very important to separate the issues that brought secession
and what motivated people in the Confederacy during the war. Those are two
related issues, but they're not the same thing. Secession came because the cotton
South believed that Abraham Lincoln's election, the election of a Republican,
posed a sufficient threat to the long-term stability of slavery to make secession a
smart choice. It's all about slavery (secession is), absolutely, it's all about slavery.
You take slavery out of the picture in 1860, and you don't get secession. I see no
way for secession without slavery. I don't think there can be any question about
that, and I don't think that any serious scholar does question that. The fact that the
Republicans had a plank in their platform that said they would leave slavery
alone wherever it existed struck slaveholders as dishonest. They knew that both
Lincoln and Seward , the two most famous Republicans at that stage, had said, in
very well-known speeches from 1858, that the nation couldn't exist half-slave
and half-free. Slaveholders knew that both Lincoln and Seward wanted the nation
to be all-free, and therefore they just didn't trust this idea that Republicans
wouldn't strike at slavery wherever it was, never mind that they were going to
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block it in the territories. So secession is all about slavery. Once you get
secession, once you get the cascading crises in the wake of that first round of
seceding states, then other factors do come into play. And I think motivations for
actually supporting the Confederacy and going into the Confederate army were
various, just as they were with the United States soldiers. But I think protecting
home ground, not being dictated to by the United States, those are very
important. But Confederates talked, all the time, about preserving their way of
life, preserving their country, preserving their homes, and all of those things are
tied, inextricably, to the fact that they lived in a slaveholding society, in a society
that gave them racial control over 3.5 million black people. Slavery is important
any way you look at this, but I think different kinds of motivations come into
play in terms of what why soldiers went into the army for the Confederacy, for
example. But we have to take as a base line that the vast majority--you can't say
everybody because with millions of people there are always outliers--the vast
majority of the white south, whether or not they owned slaves, had a profound
interest in slavery as a means of race control, in addition to slavery as a means of
economic control in some ways.
CWBR: During Grant's campaign, how did many northerners justify going
through the trial of so many casualties? It seems almost as if Grant gets a pass for
the tremendous casualties. Was it the promise of a stronger Union?
GG: He didn't get a pass from all citizens in the North. A lot of the
Democratic newspapers, especially the Copperhead kind of newspapers such as
The Old Guard, were very hard on Grant. Some of them began to call him a
butcher; that's mainly an epithet that was leveled against him by Confederate
newspapers but some of the newspapers in the United States did so as well. I
think it was a measure of the devotion to Union that the citizenry was willing to
put up with that level of loss in the spring and summer of 1864, although it was a
close thing in the summer. We always need to remind ourselves that United
States victory was not pre-ordained. The United States could have lost the war. I
think that more than once the Confederacy came close to meeting the test it
needed to meet for success. The Confederacy had an easier test than the United
States did. All the Confederacy had to do and Lee understood this very well--was
persuade the civilian population of the United States that it wasn't worth the cost.
I think Overland Campaign pushed a significant part of the civilian population
close to that point in the summer of 1864, from late June and through July and
into August. I think it was--of course this isn't new with me--Sherman in Atlanta
and Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley that turned things around and re-elected
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Lincoln and the Republicans who, of course, had not run as Republicans in 1864.
They ran as the Union Party, which is another very clear indication of how
important that concept was. Let's don't even call ourselves Republicans, they
said, we'll bring in the greatest possible support if we call ourselves the Union
Party. It was close in the summer of 1864. Grant did get some criticism; the
person who was largely immune from criticism and a person who was a much
bloodier general than Grant, first to last, was Lee. That's one of the interesting
topics of the war. We're off-subject a bit, but Lee essentially was given a pass by
the people of the Confederacy. That's always fascinated me.
CWBR: You seem to be arguing for a middle ground when you discuss the
role that the Union Army played in emancipation, a coming together of opposing
traditions (military and social). How important is an understanding of both
perspectives in the process of emancipation and the execution of the war?
GG: There are several factors that have to be in any consideration of the
process of emancipation, and it was a process. Lincoln has to be in it; Lincoln's
absolutely one of the crucial factors. Congress is very important, beginning with
the first Confiscation Act in the summer of 1861 and moving through all of that
legislation in the spring and summer of 1862. And, of course, the actions of
hundreds of thousands of enslaved people in the Confederacy are very important,
the notion of self-emancipation that W.E.B. Dubois advanced in the mid-1930s
and which has been picked up by any number of historians beginning in the late
1960s and coming down, most recently, through Steven Hahn and others now.
All of those are very important elements of the process, but my argument is the
one that gets left out is the role of the United States Army. If you take the United
States Army out of the equation, you don't get emancipation no matter what any
of those other people want; it doesn't matter. If the United States Army doesn't go
somewhere, emancipation doesn't go there either. It's fascinating to look at the
geography of emancipation in the Confederacy during the war. Where are the
roughly half-million enslaved people who actually achieved freedom during the
war? And I take this number from Ira Berlin's project at Maryland, which I think
is the gold standard in that regard; it's about a half a million, bout one in seven.
One in seven, where are they? They're where the United States Army went and
stayed for a significant period of time: up and down the Mississippi River, the
Lower Peninsula in Virginia, in significant parts of Tennessee, that's where
emancipation comes. It comes where the army goes. What is the degree of
emancipation in Texas? Virtually zero; the United States Army doesn't get there,
so it doesn't matter how much an enslaved person wants to be free. In Texas,
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there's no chance because the army doesn't come. So I just think it's very
important to put the army, not only in the picture, but put the army very
prominently in the picture. And also, to make the point that it doesn't even matter
whether the soldiers in the army want emancipation to come or not. A lot of them
do; by the end of the war, I think most of them did, though again, not for the
reasons we would want but they still did. But even somebody who isn't really for
emancipation, an army commander who's not really for emancipation--Sherman
would be a good example of that--still acts as a destructive agent regarding
slavery as he moves his army through central Georgia or wherever he's going.
The army is absolutely critical to the process of emancipation.
CWBR: Stephanie McCurry's most recent book suggests taking the slaves
seriously in the ways in which they negotiated freedom, that they had to navigate
a difficult environment when the Union army came marching through the
Confederate countryside. How might your findings complement or contradict the
concept of the slave as an active player in emancipation?
GG: I don't contradict it at all. I think that enslaved people did play an active
role when they were in a situation where they could. I'll just come back to my
earlier point; the situation has to be one where there is the possibility of freedom,
and that possibility of freedom lies in the presence of a United States military
force near enough at hand to make the decision for freedom one that was
attainable. It might still be very difficult to get to Union lines, it often was, but
they had to be close enough to get there. So I see no inherent contradiction at all
between the idea of an enslaved people working hard to achieve their own
emancipation and the fact that the United States Army was crucial in allowing
them to do so. I see no contradiction there; it's just that I would argue that it
doesn't matter how much an enslaved person wants to be free, they cannot be free
within the context of the Civil War unless the conditions are appropriate and the
crucial factor is: has the United States Army come close enough to make it
possible?
CWBR: David Blight has become the staple for looking at postbellum
reconciliation. Does recognition of slavery and its abolition as major war
motivations or war goals hold northern and southern whites accountable for
rebuilding their postbellum society?
GG: Well, I think reconciliation has been exaggerated; I don't think most
people were reconciled after the Civil War. I think there's a difference between
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reconciliation and reunion, and there's an interesting study that will be coming
out soon by Caroline Janney. She's writing a book on the memory of the war that
is going to deal with these themes, and distinguishing between reunion and
reconciliation is one of her points. I think she's exactly right. Of course reunion
began at Appomattox; the two sections are put back together into the nation. But
true reconciliation--the kind of reconciliation where the opposing parties would
say it doesn't really matter who was right or wrong, let's just talk about how brave
we all were together, and let's airbrush black people out of the picture, and just
have a white drama of triumph--I don't think that ever really happened. I think it
happened in key places, sort of showcase places, but reconciliation for Union
veterans was--and Grant is a perfect example of this--their version of
reconciliation was: we were right, you were wrong, and now we welcome you
back on those terms. That's not really reconciliation of the sort that's often put
forward. I think the animosities were profound, and I don't think they ever went
away for the wartime generation. And the mass of white veterans did not airbrush
emancipation out of the picture. That doesn't mean they held the kind of racial
views we would want them to hold, but they didn't airbrush emancipation out.
There's a wealth of evidence that supports this point. In the speeches at Union
monument dedications--the ones at Gettysburg are the easiest ones to get to the
speakers talk about Union the most but also talk a lot about emancipation.
Emancipation was a good thing; emancipation hurt the slaveholding class, it
removed this future threat to the republic, it made a better republic possible. I
don't subscribe to the idea that there's this great collective amnesia that swept
over white people North and South in terms of which side was right and which
side was wrong. I don't think most Confederates would have ever said that they
were wrong; they weren't happy that they lost and they weren't happy that slavery
was gone but they accepted reality. And the United States veterans who won the
war would never have said that it didn't matter whether you fought for Union or
fought for the Confederacy. For Union veterans, they had been right and they
were willing to reconcile on those terms: "You ex-Rebels were wrong and we
defeated you, now you can now come back into the Union.
CWBR: During an 1889 battlefield dedication at Gettysburg, Joshua
Chamberlain says "our thoughts were not then of States as States, but of the
States united, ---of that union and oneness in which the People of the United
States lived and moved and had their being “[T]he cause for which we fought
was higher; our thought was wider.” What is lost is slavery of men and
supremacy of States." Was the Union the ultimate contribution of the wartime
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generation to the future of the United States?
GG: I think the wartime generation would have absolutely said yes, and they
would have said that it was an improved Union because it no longer had slavery
in it and therefore did not have a powerful oligarchic class of slaveholders. I
absolutely think they would have said that the primary outcome of this war was
Union. Emancipation is also extremely important, they would have said, for
those reasons, because it helps the Union. It makes the Union stronger; it protects
the Union going forward. I think that Chamberlain gets at that. Chamberlain
certainly mentions emancipation, and he would have been much closer than most
Union soldiers to the position that we, in the twenty first century, would want the
Union soldiers to have regarding emancipation. But it is about the Union; you
have to save the Union first. To repeat myself, they would have also said it's a
better Union. War made a better Union. It's a better Union because that ticking
time bomb of slavery has been excised. So, for most of the loyal citizenry, they
had taken care of all of the business at the end of the war. They had saved the
Union, and with the Thirteenth Amendment they had gotten rid of slavery. The
only reason they went beyond those things was because in the war's immediate
aftermath former Confederates did not seem to understand they had been
defeated. I don't think there's any great lost moment in Reconstruction, I
absolutely do not. The Fourteenth Amendment was, in the
mid-nineteenth-century perspective, mainly designed to punish slaveholders
again; that's what loyal citizens would have said. Even the Fifteenth Amendment
represented a way to punish the former slaveholding oligarchs. The only reason
we got to those two amendments was because the white South behaved so badly,
with a big assist from Andrew Johnson, in the wake of Appomattox. I think that
many of the loyal citizens said: wait a minute; they're not acting like they lost the
war. They're acting like they didn't lose the war! They were offended by that, and
so they went beyond the Thirteenth Amendment.
CWBR: Professor Gallagher, thank you for taking the time to discuss The
Union War with us.
GG: You're certainly welcome.
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